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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v.

:

BROOKS BRADSHAW

:

Case No. 20020137-CA

Defendant/Appellant

INTRODUCTION
Given the ambiguous terms of the communications fraud statute and the absence
of evidence that Mr. Bradshaw operated an enterprise, the trial judge erred in denying
Mr. Bradshaw's motion to quash. In its treatment of the communications fraud statute,
the State erroneously assumes that this statute is plain. To the contrary, that statute is
confusing and susceptible to multiple interpretations. The State's interpretation of that
provision represents a drastic departure from the common law, would set Utah apart from
all other jurisdictions, and raises constitutional challenges to the statute. As for the
racketeering charge, the State mischaracterizes the record in claiming that Mr. Bradshaw
failed to preserve his challenge to that count. Both Mr. Bradshaw and the State
specifically argued below the sufficiency of the evidence that Mr. Bradshaw operated an
enterprise. The stipulated facts fail to establish that an enterprise existed, in law or in
fact. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the denial of the motion to dismiss.

I.

THE
AMBIGUOUS
LANGUAGE
OF
THE
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE, COMMON
LAW DOCTRINES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS
BAR THE STATE FROM
TRANSFORMING MISDEMEANOR OFFENSES INTO
MULTIPLE, SECOND DEGREE FELONIES

The communications fraud statute includes confusing language about the penalty
for separate communications that are part of a common plan or scheme. Because of this
ambiguous language, the rule of lenity requires this Court to constme the communications
fraud statute favorably to criminal defendants. The State's proposal to elevate several
misdemeanor crimes to multiple felony offenses conflicts with the common law and
would designate Utah as the only jurisdiction that aggregates misdemeanors amounts to
create multiple felonies. Further, the statute's failure to specify the unit of prosecution
violates double jeopardy protections.

A.

The Communications Fraud Statute Contains
Confusing Provisions and Fails to Identify the
Penalty for Multiple Communications.

The communications fraud statute does not plainly authorize prosecutors to
aggregate the amount sought to be taken from all fraudulent communications and then
charge that amount for each separate communication. Rather, the language of that statute
is susceptible to multiple interpretations. First, it could be viewed as simply granting
prosecutors discretion either to charge each communication separately or to aggregate all
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communications into a single charge that targets an overall "scheme or fraud." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(2), (5) (1999). Second, the State's interpretation, although
unreasonable and harsh, is another possible reading. Third, because both the separate
communication and aggregation clauses apply only when made to further a "scheme oi
artifice," the statute could be read as limiting aggregation of each communication to
situations when the defendant has devised a plan to obtain a specific amount of money or
property in a single, overall scheme. Id In other words, the statute may contemplate
aggregating the total when a scheme targets a specific dollar amount or particular items
that have specified values.
Trial judges' various interpretations of this statute support the ambiguity of the
statute. If the language of the statute were plain, judges would be expected to generally
agree on the meaning of the words. But, the widely differing views of the language
suggests that the statute is not as clear as the State claims. Both the text and trial judges'
application of the communications fraud statute demonstrate its ambiguity.

B.

The Absence of Support From Other
Jurisdictions Confirms that the State has
Misinterpreted the Communications Fraud
Statute,

Other states' approaches to aggregation clauses undermine the State's reasoning
Mr Bradshaw agrees with the State that no other state aggregates dollar amounts m the
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manner the State proposes. But, rather than supporting a legislative intent to punish
small-time offenders like felons, the uniqueness of the State's interpretation demonstrates
the extremeness of the State's position. No other state allows prosecutors to aggregate
the total amounts sought to be taken in several communications, apply that amount to
each separate communication, and then charge each communication as a felony based on
the total amount sought. The prevailing view merely authorizes prosecutors to choose
either to charge separate crimes as misdemeanors or to pool all of the crimes into a single
felony count. In addition to the cases cited in Appellant's brief, numerous other
jurisdictions adopt this very approach. Appellant's Brief at 20-21; State v. Brown, 518
A.2d 670, 673-74 (Conn. Ct. App. 1986); State v. O'Flvnn. 496 A.2d 348, 351 (N.H.
1985); State v. Jurcsek. 588 A.2d 875, 879 (N.J. Super. 1991).
The State's extreme position undercuts its arguments. In assessing whether a
statute is plain, the Utah Supreme Court recently endorsed confirming its reading of a
statute with other courts' treatment of an issue. State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ^[12, 52
P.3d 1276. In Martinez, for example, the high court concluded that a statute plainly
created a strict liability offense, in part, because the majority of other jurisdictions agreed
with this position. Id
In contrast, no other state supports the State's radical interpretation of the
communications fraud statute. Moreover, the State's argument that the federal mail and
wire fraud statutes establish felonies is unavailing because those statutes include no
4

aggregation clauses and do not attempt to enhance penalties in the manner the State
proposes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-43. The State is simply alone in its quest to transform
misdemeanor offenses into second degree felonies.
Because the State's interpretation is so extreme and harsh, this Court should
require plainer language from the legislature before adopting that view. In this case, for
instance, the State's approach increases Mr. Bradshaw's potential punishment from a
maximum of 11 years to a total of 165 years. Numerous other crimes would be affected
as well because they refer to the specific penalty scheme in the communications fraud
statute to determine the penalty for similar fraud offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 19-6429(2)(b) (1998) (fraudulent obtaining of certificate of compliance for underground
storage tanks); Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-110(2)(b), (4) (2001) (workers compensation
fraud); Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-413(2) (1998) (fraudulent selling of motor vehicles); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-52 l(2)(b) (1999) (insurance fraud); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703(3)
(1999) (computer fraud). Moreover, adopting the State's position would equate 10
misdemeanor frauds involving $500 each with 10 second degree felonies involving 10
separate frauds involving $5,000 a piece. This Court should require more specific
language before imposing such a draconian sentencing scheme.
As the State concedes, the communications fraud statute is similar to the Louisiana
statute at issue in State v. Joles, 492 So. 2d 490, 491-92 (La. 1986). State's Brief at 15
n.8. That Court ruled that "[i]t is much more logical to construe [such a legislative
5

scheme] as evidencing an intent to permit" but not to require prosecutors to aggregate
several small crimes into one serious crime. UL at 494 (emphasis in original). Without
the legislature adopting a more definite statement of its intent, the more "reasonable"
result is to grant prosecutors discretion to treat several small offenses as one large one.
id

C.

The Common Law and Constitutional
Protections Support Barring the State From
Aggregating the Total Amount Sought to be
Taken in a Scheme and Applying that Amount
to Each Communication,

The common law and the federal and state constitutions further undermine the
State's position. The policies underlying both the single larceny rule and the rule against
mulitplicity agree that the criminal law favors criminal defendants when construing
ambiguous criminal statutes. The single larceny doctrine allows the State to treat several
petty crimes as a single more serious offense. State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 391 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997). But, it also seeks to avoid unfairly imposing multiple penalties when a
single crime occurs. State v. Barken 624 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1981). Likewise, the rule
against multiplicity addresses the same concern. United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104,
1108 n.4 (6lh Cir. 1988). The spirit of these doctrines bars the State from morphing
several minor crimes into multiple major offenses.
The legislature presumably knew of these limitations on the multiplying of charges
6

when it enacted the communications fraud statute. "In enacting legislation, the legislature
is presumed to be aware of the common law." State v. Hermsdorf, 605 A.2d 1045, 1047
(N.H. 1992); see also Gottling v. PR. Inc.. 2002 UT 95,ffl[14,29> 4 5 6

Utah

Adv. Rep.

14. Although Mr. Bradshaw does not dispute that generally courts should harmonize the
provisions of a statute, this Court must also consider existing common law doctrines
when construing statutory text. Reading the communications fraud statute as merely
providing prosecutors discretion to aggregate multiple misdemeanor charges into a single
felony count is consistent with the common law policy of avoiding multiple or excessive
punishments and gives meaning to each subsection of the statute.
As discussed above, the Louisiana Supreme Court came to this same exact
conclusion in addressing a similar statute. Joles, 492 So. 2d at 494-95. Although the
State concedes the similarities between the communications fraud statute and the theft
statute in Joles, it argues that Joles is distinguishable because the single larceny doctrine
does not apply to crimes "involving distinct acts with distinct victims." State's Brief at 15
n.8. The State fails to recognize the general policy concerns embodied in the single
larceny rule and the rule against multiplicity of avoiding excessive punishments. Joles
directly addressed this concern and found that the legislature could not have "reasonably"
intended to treat an offender of several minor crimes the same as a major offender of
multiple crimes. 492 So. 2d at 494-95. The same reasoning applies here.
The Double Jeopardy clauses to the state and federal constitutions raise similar
7

concerns. As this case demonstrates, when the legislature fails to describe the unit of
prosecution, "overzealous" prosecutions may result. State v. Turner, 6 P.3d 1226, 1230
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000). The ambiguity in the communications fraud statute allowed the
State to punish Mr. Bradshaw not only for 11 separate acts but also 11 times for taking
over $5,000 when he took that amount only once.
The State counters that the legislature has power to prescribe any penalty it wants
for crimes. State's Brief at 19. Although this assertion in generally true, subject to the
ban against imposing cruel and unusual punishments, Mr. Bradshaw argues that the
legislature has shown no intent to allow prosecutors to aggregate the amounts sought
from all communications made and then to charge multiple felony counts. In the absence
of the legislature identifying prosecutors' power, the State cannot arbitrarily inflate
crimes whenever it sees fit without violating double jeopardy principles. Turner. 6 P.3d
at 1230.

D.

Because the Communications Fraud Statute is
Ambiguous, the Rule of Lenity Requires this
Court to Construe it Favorably to Criminal
Defendants.

Under each of the doctrines discussed above, whenever a statute is ambiguous, the
rule of lenity demands giving criminal defendants the lesser of two possible penalties.
Duncan, 850 F.2d at 1108 n.4; Patience, 944 P.2d at 385; State v. Adel 965 P.2d 1072,
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1075 (Wash. 1998). Here, at most, this Court should construe the ambiguous language of
the communications fraud statute as only granting the State discretion to charge each
communication separately or to aggregate the entire amount sought in an overall scheme
and charge a single count. This approach upholds this Court's duty to construe
ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant. Patience, 944 P.2d at 385.

II.

MR. BRADSHAW DID NOT OPERATE A CRIMINAL
ENTERPRISE BECAUSE HE NEVER FORMED A
BUSINESS ENTITY NOR WERE HIS ACTIONS
ANALOGOUS TO A BUSINESS.

To establish a racketeering crime, the State must show that a person used, invested
in, or otherwise had an interest in a criminal enterprise. An individual can be an
enterprise if that person forms a business entity or acts like a business organization. Here,
Mr. Bradshaw formed no business concern, acted in his individual capacity, and
minimally associated with others. Contrary to the State's claims, Mr. Bradshaw raised
these very arguments in the trial court. Moreover, the stipulated facts provided no
reasonable basis for inferring that Mr. Bradshaw operated a criminal enterprise, in law or
fact. Thus, Mr. Bradshaw was not subject to enterprise liability.

9

A.

Mr, Bradshaw Specifically Argued Below
That He Acted Individually and Not As An
Enterprise.

The State erroneously claims that Mr. Bradshaw failed to preserve his challenge to
the racketeering charge. Rather than fully addressing the merits of Mr. Bradshaw's
challenge, the State argues that he "impermissibly expands" his arguments on appeal.
State's Brief at 22. The State misapplies the preservation doctrine.
To preserve arguments for appellate review, appellants need only timely raise the
issues to provide the trial court an "'opportunity'" to decide them. State v. Labium, 925
P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah) cert, denied
493 U.S. 814 (1989)). The record reveals that Mr. Bradshaw more than met this standard.
He specifically argued in his motion to quash that because he acted in his individual
capacity, "there is no criminal enterprise here." R. 92-93. In particular, Mr. Bradshaw
asserted that he did not Minvest[] in any enterprise" because he did not engage in any
activities with an enterprise as that term was statutorily defined. R. 92-94. Rather, he
argued, in both his motion and at the hearing, that merely paying one's personal bills does
not constitute enterprise liability. R. 93-94; 156: 7. He argued further that under the
State's definition of an enterprise, the State could convict any individual for racketeering
who committed three crimes for financial gain, such as a prostitution or forgery. R. 94.
The State's preservation arguments appear to be somewhat disingenuous because
the State litigated this issue, at length. In its opposition to the motion to quash, the State
10

contended that "an individual may be an enterprise" under the definition given in the
racketeering statute. R. 108. According to the State, individuals who use income derived
from a scheme for their own interests constituted an enterprise. R. 110. In support of its
arguments, the State recited the same Utah and federal case law that Mr. Bradshaw raised
in his opening brief. R. 108-111. Thus, both parties briefed and argued the very issues
raised in this appeal.
Because Mr. Bradshaw specifically claimed that he did not constitute or operate an
enterprise, no questions about preservation exist. On appeal, he has only added case law
in support of the same arguments he made in the trial court. Because Mr. Bradshaw
timely raised his claims and provided the trial court an '"opportunity5" to decide them, he
preserved them for appeal. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939 (quoting Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36).

B.

No Enterprise Existed Here Because Mr,
Bradshaw Formed No Business Entity and He
Did Not Conduct His Affairs Analogously to a
Business.

The State further misconstrues Mr. Bradshaw's arguments by summarily
dismissing his challenges to enterprise liability. Contrary to the State's assertions, this
Court has specifically applied federal law in ruling that for a person to constitute an
enterprise under the first two prongs of the racketeering statute that person must have
officially formed a business entity or conducted one's affairs consistent with a business.
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Because neither of those situations applied here, the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss
the racketeering charge.
Based on this Court's own application of federal law in State v. Hutchings, 950
P.2d 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), no enterprise existed. As this Court found in that case,
the racketeering statute '"was primarily directed at halting the investment of racketeering
proceeds into legitimate businesses, including the practice of money laundering.'" hi at
430 (quoting Brittingham v. Mobil Corp., 943 F.2d 297, 304 (3rd Cir. 1991) (emphasis
added)). Thus, that statute targets business "entities]." Id at 433. As defense counsel
argued below, any other conclusion would result in a racketeering conviction anytime a
person commits three similar crimes for personal gain. Weinacht v. State, 744 So. 2d
1197, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 682 A.2d 811,816 (Pa.
Super. 1996).
This Court made this conclusion clear in Hutchings. Specifically addressing the
first two prongs of the racketeering statute, this Court held that the defendant's formation
and operation of a sole proprietorship called Applied Financial Concepts constituted a
business entity for purposes of establishing an enterprise because it was an "ongoing
organization that functioned as a continuing unit." Hutchings, 950 P.2d at 434. But, the
maintaining of shell bank accounts in the defendant's name alone did not establish an
enterprise because it was not '"analogous to a legal entity such as a coiporation or to an
association of individuals.'" IdL (quoting Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 283
12

(5th Cir. 1992)). In sum, this Court held that a person only constitutes an enterprise under
the first two prongs of the racketeering statute if that person fonns an "informal" business
entity or operates an "association-in fact." kl
Because Mr. Bradshaw never formed a business entity of any sort, he only
operated an enterprise if he conducted his affairs as an "association-in-fact." id. Courts
generally agree that such an association exists when a person engages in activities
analogous to a business and include an ongoing organization, a common purpose, and
continuity. United States v. Turkette. 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); State v. Rael 981 P.2d
280, 283-84 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 637 (Utah 1988)
Hutchings, 950 P.2d at 434. None of these factors existed here. At most, the State
showed that two persons were present when Mr. Bradshaw made an undetermined
number of misrepresentations and that he asked one of them to falsely portray himself as
an appraiser. The State presented no evidence that these men shared an intent to defraud,
perpetuated the misrepresentations, received any compensation, or made any
misrepresentations themselves. There is no evidence of any structure, organization,
common purpose, or continuity. Instead, the State merely offers speculation.
Based on these facts, the State failed to establish a reasonable inference that Mr.
Bradshaw operated an association-in-fact. To survive a motion to quash, the State must
present sufficient evidence "to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant committed it." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16, 20 P.3d
13

300. Accepting all the stipulated facts as true, the State foiled to meet its burden of
proving an enterprise. The facts merely show that in addition to the two men's
observations, Mr. Bradshaw claimed that he held interests in mortgage companies. But,
these misrepresentations failed to establish that Mr. Bradshaw's actions were analogous
to a business. He, in fact, did not have any ownership interests in any company. Rather,
he operated as a lone individual.
This case is nearly identical to Hutchings, in which the defendant maintained shell
bank accounts. The defendant in that case established numerous registered and
unregistered dbas and set up bank accounts for them. 950 P.2d at 427. Although these
accounts gave the appearance that defendant had connections to numerous legitimatesounding businesses, in reality, the defendant was the sole signatory on the accounts and
the only person who deposited or withdrew money out of them. ]dL This Court reasoned
that these personal accounts were not analogous to a legal entity because they were
simply intangible rights. 14. at 434.
Likewise, Mr. Bradshaw's conduct involved no tangible connection to business.
There was no evidence of an organization, any ongoing associations, or continuity.
McGrath, 749 P.2d at 637. Rather, Mr. Bradshaw appeared as a blip on a radar screen for
less than six months and then disappeared. This ,u[s]poradic, temporary"' activity did not
amount to a business enterprise. Rael 981 P.2d at 284 (quoting States v. Hughes, 767
P.2d 382, 389 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)). Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to
14

dismiss this charge.
The State mischaracterizes the opening brief when it claims that Mr. Bradshaw
relies on precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that Utah courts have
rejected. State's Brief at 23 n. 13. Mr. Bradshaw has only relied on this Court's
construction of the applicable prongs of the racketeering statute in Hutchings and the
federal cases cited therein. The 8th Circuit law that the State refers to merely involves the
question of whether the State can rely on the same evidence to find a pattern of
racketeering activity and to establish an enterprise. Hutchings, 950 P.2d at 433. Mr.
Bradshaw does not dispute that the State may rely on the same evidence. Rather, he
maintains that under the stipulated facts, the State failed to present any competent
evidence that he operated an enterprise.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Bradshaw requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to
quash the bind over and to order the trial court to dismiss the criminal information.
Submitted, this J$5day of October, 2002.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

15

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
1, KENT R. HART, certify that 1 have caused to be delivered eight copies of this
brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office,
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114-0854, this /S^day of October, 2002.

KENT R. HART

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this

day of October 2002.

16

